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ABSTRACT 
Individuals often enter similar jobs via two different routes:  internal mobility and external 
hiring. I examine how the differences between these routes affect subsequent outcomes in those 
jobs. Drawing on theories of specific skills and incomplete information, I propose that external 
hires will initially perform worse than workers entering the job from inside the firm and have 
higher exit rates, yet they will be paid more and have stronger observable indicators of ability as 
measured by experience and education. I use the same theories to argue that the exact nature of 
internal mobility (promotions, lateral transfers, or combined promotions and transfers) will also 
affect workers’ outcomes. Analyses of personnel data from the U.S. investment banking arm of a 
financial services company from 2003 to 2009 confirm strong effects on pay, performance and 
mobility of how workers enter jobs. I find that workers promoted into jobs have significantly 
better performance than workers hired into similar jobs for the first two years, and lower rates of 
voluntary and involuntary exit. Nonetheless, the external hires are initially paid around 18 per 
cent more than the promoted workers and have higher levels of experience and education. The 
hires are also promoted faster. I further find that workers who are promoted and transferred at the 
same time have worse performance than other internal movers. 
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Worker mobility has increased substantially in recent years as firms have moved away from an 
employment model that focused on lifetime employment and internal mobility, and towards 
greater reliance on the external labor market to staff positions (Cappelli, 1999; Farber, 2008).   
An important consequence of these changes has been to alter the way that workers enter jobs. 
Whereas higher-level jobs used to be almost entirely entered by promotions or internal transfers, 
those jobs are often now entered by external hiring as well (Royal and Althauser, 2003).  
 
Organizational and sociological approaches to employment have long observed that the 
processes that match individuals with jobs affect employment outcomes (Granovetter, 1981). 
Existing studies have taken two broad approaches to understanding such matching processes. 
One literature has studied the processes that govern mobility in “internal labor markets” within 
organizations (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Althauser and Kalleberg, 1981; DiPrete, 1987; 
Dencker, 2009), documenting the importance of formal job ladders, administrative rules, and 
worker bargaining power in shaping movements within firms. A second literature has examined 
the nature of hiring processes in external labor markets, demonstrating for example that different 
job search methods are associated with different probabilities of receiving offers (Fernandez, 
Castilla and Moore, 2000) and the importance of various signals of job quality in workers’ 
decisions to search for and take new jobs (Halaby, 1988; Greve and Fujiwara-Greve, 2003). As 
workers increasingly use both internal and external mobility to access similar positions, though, 
it is increasingly important to directly compare internal mobility and hiring, to understand 
whether those different routes of entry into the job affect such subsequent outcomes as 
performance, pay, and mobility, or even the kinds of workers ending up in those jobs.  
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Such a comparison of the effects of internal and external mobility is of both practical and 
theoretical importance. If the route by which jobs are entered affects pay and performance, then 
the quality of the human capital that employers are able to acquire and the amount that they pay 
for that human capital is likely to depend on whether the workers involved are hired or 
developed internally. A clear comparison of the effects of hiring and internal mobility also has 
the potential to inform workers of the consequences of their career decisions.  Comparing 
internal and external labor market processes can also provide us with a richer theoretical 
understanding of the trade-offs that characterize these pathways of worker mobility and career 
development.  
 
Although a number of studies have begun to explore differences between hiring and internal 
mobility, they have stopped well short of developing the detailed comparison of internal and 
external matching processes that would underpin a better understanding of these different 
mobility processes.  Research based on tournament theory has predicted and found that external 
hires have faster subsequent promotion rates than workers promoted into the same job (Chan, 
2006).  A study of academic economists also indicated that lateral hires had stronger publication 
records than those hired internally (Oyer, 2007). In their study of a large financial services firm, 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom,(1994a) showed that workers hired into higher organizational 
levels had more work experience and education than those promoted into those positions, but the 
authors made no attempt to control for characteristics of the job that might confound those 
comparisons. Within the specific context of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) labor markets, Harris 
and Helfat (1997) found that the pay of externally hired CEOs was higher than that of CEOs 
promoted internally; however, their cross-firm design limited their ability to control for the 
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nature of the hiring organization. Yet other work has compared the pay and performance of 
workers who move to another organization with those who stay within the same organization 
(Brett and Stroh, 1997; Groysberg, Lee and Nanda, 2008). Such work offers great insight into the 
prospects of different career strategies but cannot tell whether the gains and losses are due to the 
types of jobs accessed or the nature of the matching process. With a few exceptions (Rosenbaum, 
1979; Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom, 1994a), there has also been little research on whether 
different routes to jobs within firms, such as promotions or lateral transfers, affect subsequent 
outcomes, despite reason to believe that those different routes will result in different outcomes. 
 
To formulate a more comprehensive theory about the differences between external hiring and 
internal mobility, it is useful to draw on two theories that are often used in the study of internal 
and external labor markets: theories of specific skills and incomplete information. Research on 
human resource systems and careers has noted that workers who move jobs within the firm 
(“internal movers”) differ from external hires in their levels of firm-specific skills (Sonnenfeld 
and Peiperl, 1988; Lepak and Snell, 1999), while internal labor market theory has explored the 
consequences of these specific skills for performance and career paths within firms (Althauser, 
1989). The kinds of jobs that workers are moving from – either from within the same firm or 
from a different firm – should affect the specific skills that the workers bring to their new jobs 
and hence their performance. Theories of information and labor market matching emphasize the 
importance of information in finding a good match between the characteristics of the worker and 
the demands of the job (Granovetter, 1981; Halaby, 1988). Internal labor market theory has long 
observed that firms have better information about current employees than other workers, 
allowing them to better assess this match (Doeringer and Piore, 1971).  Access to such 
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information might affect both the characteristics of workers who enter jobs through hiring versus 
internal mobility and how much they are paid.  
 
Integrating these two theories, I predict that external hiring will have two disadvantages for firms 
relative to internal mobility: external hires are likely to perform worse than internal movers but 
be paid more. Theories of firm-specific skills predict that external hires should have lower initial 
performance than internal movers. The effects of incomplete information can prevent employers 
from balancing this lower performance with lower pay for external hires; because employers are 
more uncertain about external hires’ abilities, they may compensate by hiring workers with 
stronger observable indicators of ability than internal candidates. Because external hires know 
less about their potential fit with the job than do internal candidates, they may also demand more 
pay to make up for the risk of a poor fit. Although external hires should benefit from that higher 
pay, their lack of firm-specific skills and uncertain fit should create costs for them too, in the 
form of higher rates of voluntary and involuntary exit than internal movers. 
 
I further develop these predictions by exploring the effects of different kinds of internal mobility. 
First, workers who move to positions that are more different from their prior jobs, such as 
workers who are simultaneously promoted and transferred laterally, should have fewer job-
specific skills and perform worse. Second, lateral transfers should have more externally valuable 
experience and a worse potential fit than workers who are promoted, which may affect their pay. 
I tested these predictions using seven years of personnel data from a U.S. financial services 
institution, conducting a comprehensive comparison of outcomes for workers who enter similar 
jobs from inside and outside the firm. I examined the effects of external hiring versus internal 
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mobility on workers’ pay, performance, indicators of ability, and subsequent mobility. I do not 
address the costs incurred before the jobs are filled, such as the costs of training workers for 
potential promotions or forecasting the demand for skilled workers, even though those costs may 
also shape decisions about hiring versus internal mobility (Cappelli, 2008). Instead, I examine 
the effects of different matching processes on what happens to workers after they enter their jobs. 
 
EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL HIRING VERSUS INTERNAL MOBILITY 
 
Workers can enter similar jobs – as defined by criteria such as functional roles, reporting 
relationships, and hierarchical rank – through either internal mobility or external hiring. Internal 
mobility itself can take a number of forms. Perhaps the most common type of internal mobility is 
promotion, defined as moves within an organization to a job that is in a higher administrative 
rank and usually associated with higher pay, status, responsibilities and skill requirements 
(DiPrete and Soule, 1988; Spilerman and Lunde, 1991; Cohen, Broschak, and Haveman, 1998).  
Although scholars initially argued that promotions were triggered by the need to fill a previously 
defined vacancy (White, 1970; Stewman and Konda, 1983), more recent studies show that 
promotions often occur when individuals are judged to have the skills needed for the higher rank, 
regardless of whether there is a vacancy (Stewman and Yeh, 1991; Barnett and Miner, 1992). 
Studies also emphasize that such rank mobility can occur without a single, discrete change in the 
work that an individual is carrying out; although the promotion is defined by a discrete move 
across ranks, jobs’ responsibilities often accrete more gradually over time.  
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Though a promotion may not entail an immediate change in work content, the different ranks 
usually carry different overall responsibilities and require the demonstration of different skills to 
enter them. Hence Pergamit and Veum’s (1999) analysis of the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth found that over half of the workers who reported being promoted in the previous year 
either described those promotions as “upgrade promotions” (commonly understood as a 
reclassification of a job to a higher level (Barnett and Miner, 1992)) or said they continued to 
perform basically the same duties as before. Yet those same workers who reported little 
immediate change upon promotion had similar probabilities of receiving increased 
responsibilities during the following year compared with those who said that their promotion led 
into a higher-level job in a different section (Pergamit and Veum, 1999).  Hence, although 
promotions may not always involve a step change in the tasks that a worker performs, they 
nonetheless represent entry into a different job. 
 
A second form of internal mobility is lateral transfers, which occur when individuals remain 
within the same vertical rank but move to a different organizational unit or a different kind of job 
(Stewman, 1986). Although transfers also reflect organizational attempts to match workers to 
appropriate jobs, the circumstances that lead to such transfers are likely more diverse than the 
circumstances triggering promotions. In some cases, workers may be performing poorly in their 
current jobs, and their new role may be expected to suit them better. In other cases, a transfer 
may reflect a worker’s desire for a role with improved rewards or advancement prospects. 
Transfers may also be used to broaden workers’ skills in preparation for future positions. A third 
variant of internal mobility occurs when workers move vertically and horizontally at the same 
time, by being promoted while also transferring to a different organizational unit or a job outside 
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the traditional line of progression. Stewman and Yeh (1991) defined such moves as “vacancy 
promotions,” because transfers across units are more likely to be triggered by vacancies than 
acquisition of new skills, but I do not adopt this terminology. Whether there is a vacancy is not 
relevant to my theory development, which focuses on the change in the work the individual is 
doing. 
 
External hiring occurs when workers enter the organization for the first time. Unlike internal 
mobility, external hiring is usually not classified based on the hierarchical job that hires came 
from, because of the frequent absence of data on those prior jobs and the conceptual difficulty of 
comparing hierarchical levels across firms. Hiring a worker for a higher level may happen when 
there is a specific vacancy to be filled, but it can also be triggered by the availability of an 
attractive candidate (Granovetter, 1974; Rosenbaum, 1990). 
 
Because external and internal mobility often occur through different processes, they may not 
directly compete with one another for every move (Rosenbaum et al., 1990). Promotions may 
take place when a worker is believed to have reached a certain skill level without hiring being 
considered as an alternative. Opportunistic hiring may sometimes take place without considering 
whether to promote a current worker to the position. Instead, tradeoffs take place over time; in 
particular, when the organization has promoted several workers in a particular area, it will have 
less need to hire workers with the skills to take on similar responsibilities. Over time, both hiring 
and promotion will be used as routes to fill similar jobs, even if they are not always considered 
simultaneously. Despite being substitutes, though, these routes may lead to different subsequent 
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outcomes, due in part to differences in the skills that new hires and promoted workers will bring 
with them.  
 
Specific Skills and Performance 
 
Every job requires specific knowledge about the formal processes and informal routines used to 
do the work, about how to work with specific colleagues, the tools and technologies required on 
the job, and so on (Quinones, Ford and Teachout, 1995). Although some of this knowledge may 
be acquired through formal training, much of it comes from on-the-job learning. As a 
consequence, workers who enter a position from a similar prior job are likely to have relevant 
job-specific knowledge. The more different workers’ prior positions are from their new jobs, the 
less job-specific knowledge they will have and the worse they are likely to perform as a result. 
 
 
One form of transition that can require workers to learn a great deal of new knowledge is being 
hired into a new firm (Lepak and Snell, 1999). Prior research has emphasized that firm-specific 
skills - knowledge and abilities that can only be acquired and utilized while working in a specific 
firm (Becker, 1962) – are an important form of job knowledge. Meta-analyses of studies across 
many fields confirm strong effects of organizational tenure on job performance (Sturman, 2003), 
although this could partly reflect the attrition of poor performers.  Though the importance of 
firm-specific skills may vary across different positions and organizations, research has found that 
even professional jobs that demand high levels of general skills, such as securities research, 
scientific research, and surgery, can require firm-specific skills (Allison and Long, 1990; 
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Huckman and Pisano, 2006; Groysberg, Lee, and Nanda, 2008). Although such work depends on 
individual workers’ skills and knowledge, it can also require intense coordination with others in 
the organization, coordination that is facilitated by mutual learning (Groysberg, 2010).  
 
Because internal movers have longer experience within the firm, they are likely to have already 
acquired important firm-specific skills that new hires will lack. There are good reasons to believe 
that external hires may have stronger qualifications than those promoted, but firm-specific skills 
may be important enough that new hires will still experience lower performance than internal 
movers; in some cases, hires’ experience in other similar jobs may even be counter-productive 
(Dokko, Wilk, and Rothband, 2009). Although those new hires will learn about the organization 
over time, they are likely to suffer an initial performance disadvantage when firm-specific skills 
are important:  
 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): External hires will have lower initial performance than internal movers. 
 
Changes in the specific skills needed for different jobs may also lead to performance differences 
within the group of internal movers. Just as people moving from one firm to another need to 
learn about new technologies or build new relationships, so do people moving to new jobs within 
the same firm (Quinones, Ford and Teachont, 1995; Gibbons and Waldman, 2006). When 
workers receive rank promotions, they are expected to take on new responsibilities over time. 
Transferred workers need to learn about their new work context. Though the effects of such 
changes in job-specific skills may often be less than the effects of moving to a new firm, they 
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may nonetheless influence performance. I would therefore expect internal movers to have lower 
performance when they take on jobs that are more different from their previous work.  
 
There is little theoretical basis for predicting whether promotions or transfers involve a greater 
change in job-specific skills, but mobility that entails both kinds of movement – promotions that 
are combined with a lateral transfer – likely requires a greater change in job-specific skills than 
would either move in isolation. Such a change in the job-specific skills demanded by their new 
versus old roles is likely to impede the performance of workers who are simultaneously 
transferred and promoted: 
 
 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Workers who are promoted and transferred at the same time will have 
lower initial performance than other internal movers. 
 
Incomplete Information and Workers’ Characteristics 
 
The second way in which workers’ routes into their jobs may affect their employment outcomes 
is through those routes’ effects on the information used in the matching process. All of the 
different processes that place individuals in jobs aim to create an effective match between the 
characteristics of the job and the skills and needs of the workers taking those jobs. Firms look for 
workers who will perform to an acceptable level in the job; workers seek jobs that will be a good 
fit for their abilities and provide rewards that they value. A key determinant of the parties’ ability 
to form an effective match is the amount of information they can use to assess this match 
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(Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Granovetter, 1981), but firms and workers often have highly 
incomplete information about each other. Firms struggle to evaluate the true qualities of 
applicants (Schmidt and Hunter, 1998), and workers struggle to know which of the jobs available 
will best suit their preferences and abilities (Halaby, 1988). How the different routes into jobs 
affect the information available to workers and firms may therefore influence subsequent 
outcomes.   
 
Problems of incomplete information shape the differences between internal and external mobility 
because workers and employers expect to know more about each other during internal moves 
than during external hiring (Waldman, 1984; Greenwald, 1986). Some correlates of performance, 
such as a worker’s education and the jobs he or she has held, are “externally observable,” in that 
they can be observed by all potential employers (Spence, 1973; Granovetter, 1981). Other 
important correlates of performance are “externally unobservable,” though, in that they can only 
be assessed by the current employer. Examples of such externally unobservable information 
include details about how workers have performed in prior roles and how they would fit with the 
idiosyncratic demands of the job or the organization (Chatman, 1991; Edwards, 1991; O'Reilly, 
Chatman, and Caldwell, 1991). 
 
Previous research has demonstrated the importance of externally unobservable information for 
employment outcomes. Gibbons and Katz (1991) found that laid-off workers had better 
employment prospects when their plant was shut down, suggesting that future employers were 
concerned that plants were otherwise able to identify and lay off weaker employees. Hiring 
studies have found that recruiters set great store on references from previous employers (Crain, 
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1984; Bills, 1999); given the difficulty of getting honest references (Miller and Rosenbaum, 
1997), first-hand experience with the workers should be even more helpful. And though studies 
of hiring emphasize the low predictive power of interviews and other common selection devices 
(Arvey and Campion, 1982; Posthuma, Morgeson, and Campion, 2002), analyses of workers’ 
performance ratings within firms demonstrate a high cross-period correlation (Sturman, 
Cheramie, and Cashen, 2005).  
 
These differences in the information available during internal mobility versus external hiring are 
likely to shape how firms screen candidates from these different routes. The firm’s challenge in 
staffing higher-level positions is to find workers whose overall skills and ability allow them to 
perform at an acceptable level. In choosing whether an internal candidate should be promoted to 
a higher level, the firm can assess the worker based on what it knows about both his or her 
externally observable and externally unobservable attributes. If the worker has the skills 
necessary to be effective at the higher level, then he or she will be promoted. The organization is 
similarly well placed to assess the externally unobservable attributes of potential transfers.  We 
would therefore expect the pool of chosen internal candidates to be above average on both 
externally observable and unobservable attributes. In assessing external candidates, the firm 
lacks information about externally unobservable attributes. The hiring managers must assume 
that external candidates are, at best, average on those unobservable dimensions – although 
adverse selection theories suggest that those candidates may be below average on those 
unobservable dimensions, which is why they are seeking another job (Akerlof, 1970; Greenwald, 
1986). We would therefore expect internal movers to have stronger externally unobservable 
attributes than external hires. 
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It is likely that firms will compensate for these differences in externally unobservable attributes 
by changing the way that they evaluate externally observable attributes.  Given that many higher-
level jobs require a minimum level of performance, firms may be reluctant to hire workers who 
are expected to fall below that performance threshold. One way to maintain performance above 
that threshold is to require that external hires have stronger observable indicators of ability than 
internal movers in similar positions. For example, a firm may be willing to promote an internal 
candidate with poor observable attributes, because its externally unobservable knowledge 
suggests that he or she she will be successful in that role. The firm would not be willing to hire 
an external candidate with similarly low levels of externally unobservable attributes, because it 
could not have externally unobservable knowledge that the new hire would succeed. 
 
Just as firms know less about external hires than they do about internal movers, external hires 
similarly know less about the firm. Given the difficulties of comparing jobs across organizations 
(Baron and Bielby, 1986), external hires may sometimes apply for and accept jobs for which 
they are overqualified. Though underqualified applicants are likely to be screened out by the 
employer,  overqualified candidates may end up being hired. Because internal candidates are less 
likely to apply for jobs for which they are over qualified, such effects would also lead external 
candidates to have stronger observable indicators of ability than internal movers. Based on both 
of these arguments, I propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): External hires will have stronger externally observable indicators of 
ability, such as experience or education, than internal movers. 
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There are also grounds to expect differences in externally observable characteristics among the 
different kinds of internal movers. Specifically, the prior experience of lateral transfers should 
provide them with stronger observable indicators of ability than other movers. One of the 
externally observable indicators that employers most value is the record of specific jobs that an 
individual has held (Bills, 1990; O'Mahony and Bechky, 2006). By definition, lateral transfers 
are moving from a higher-ranked job than those promoted to similar jobs. The transfers therefore 
have more experience in higher-ranked jobs than do those who are promoted, experience that is 
valuable and externally observable.  
 
In some cases, the processes by which transfers are selected may also shape their observable 
attributes. Some organizations may use lateral transfers to redeploy workers who do not fit in 
their current role. Decisions to redeploy poor performers could well reflect observable attributes: 
a poor performer with weak observable attributes may be terminated; when the worker has 
stronger observable attributes, the organization may be more likely to interpret poor performance 
as a lack of fit with the current position and transfer that worker elsewhere. Based on both of 
these arguments, I predict that: 
 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Lateral transfers will have stronger observable indicators of ability, 
notably work experience, than other internal movers. 
 
Incomplete Information and Pay 
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Differences in the information available during internal mobility versus external hiring may also 
affect how workers are paid. A simple view of labor markets suggests that workers entering the 
job via internal mobility should be paid more than external hires if they have higher 
performance. Yet considering the effects of incomplete information leads to the opposite 
prediction: that external hires should be paid more than internal movers.  
 
In part, pay differences between external hires and internal movers should reflect the 
hypothesized differences in observable characteristics. External hires’ stronger observable 
indicators of ability can help those workers find high-paying jobs in other organizations and will 
be rewarded in the labor market. Unobservable attributes do not help workers find jobs in other 
organizations, and employers will face less pressure to reward such attributes. If external hires 
have stronger observable indicators of ability, we would expect them to be better paid than 
internal movers. 
 
The reduced information that external hires have about the firm and job may also affect their 
pay. Although firms may seek to give prospective hires a clear description of their job, internal 
movers are likely to have more direct knowledge about the nature of the job and how well they 
will fit with it. Internal candidates should also have a clearer understanding of how they fit the 
culture and values of the organization (Chatman, 1991), and should be a good fit for the 
organization; otherwise, they would have left the organization already (Schneider, Goldstein, and 
Smith, 1995). External hires lack this information and should assume that they will be, on 
average, a worse fit for the job and organization than internal movers. Such poor fit can lead to 
lower job satisfaction and higher turnover (Chatman, 1991; Edwards, 1991).  
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External hires’ worse expected fit with the job and organization should make the job less 
attractive to them than to an internal mover. The pay that the employer needs to offer to persuade 
an external hire to take a job is therefore higher than the pay demanded by an internal mover to 
take a similar job. These considerations of fit and observable indicators of ability imply that: 
 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): External hires will be paid more than internal movers. 
 
There may also be differences in the pay of different types of internal movers, based on these 
same factors of observable human capital and the relative attractiveness of the job. As noted 
above, transfers have valuable, externally observable experience in their current rank. That 
valuable experience should raise what other employers are prepared to pay them over time and 
consequently lead to pay raises from their current employer. People promoted into a position 
lack that externally observable experience and associated pay rises. We would therefore expect 
that transfers’ increased seniority within the higher rank will translate into higher pay. 
 
The pay of transfers and promoted workers may also be shaped by the information that their 
mobility provides about their fit with the job and organization. As I have noted above, transfers 
can sometimes reflect mediocre prior job performance and an opportunity for a fresh start 
elsewhere in the organization. In such cases, transfers’ expectations about their fit and potential 
performance are likely to be lower than promoted workers who have performed well in their 
prior role. Those transfers may therefore need to be paid more to stay in the job. At the same 
time, the firm’s decision to transfer workers rather than terminating them indicates that the firm 
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continues to see some promise in them and may be willing to pay that premium to retain them. 
Based on both of these factors, I expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): The pay of lateral transfers will be higher than the pay of other internal 
movers. 
 
Implications for Subsequent Mobility 
 
The effects of specific skills and incomplete information are also likely to affect the subsequent 
mobility of external hires and internal movers through promotions and exit. Promotions and exit 
tend to occur disproportionately among workers near the tails of the performance distribution. 
Promotions occur among those workers who are able to demonstrate the skills necessary to be 
promoted to the next level. More rapid promotions occur among those who are performing well 
ahead of expectations. By contrast, involuntary exit (both for cause and as part of downsizing) 
tends to occur among workers performing well below the average. 
 
 
The arguments developed above suggest that external hires may be disproportionately 
represented in both tails of the performance distribution. Because employers are unable to screen 
hires based on their externally unobservable attributes, hires are likely to have worse average 
unobservable attributes than internal movers, but they will also have higher variance in those 
attributes. Although many hires will turn out to have poor externally unobservable attributes, 
others will have strong externally unobservable attributes. Because employers also require 
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stronger observable attributes from hires, the hires that turn out to have strong unobservable 
attributes may be among the best performers, particularly as they begin to acquire firm-specific 
skills.  
 
If promotions are disproportionately drawn from the upper tail of the performance distribution, 
then external hires may have higher overall promotion rates than internal movers. Chan (2006) 
found evidence of such faster subsequent promotion among external hires, although he attributed 
this effect to hires having higher overall ability, rather than their being over-represented among 
higher performers. I predict that: 
 
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): External hires will have a higher rate of subsequent promotion than 
internal movers. 
 
 
In contrast to promotions, involuntary exit (both for cause and as part of downsizing) tends to 
occur among workers performing well below the average. External hires should also be well 
represented among those lowest performers. Their lack of firm-specific skills likely reduces their 
performance; the greater uncertainty about hires’ externally unobservable attributes also 
increases the risk that they will turn out to be a poor match for their jobs (Halaby, 1988). I 
predict that:  
 
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): External hires will have a higher rate of involuntary exit than internal 
movers. 
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Rates of promotion may also vary among the different kinds of internal movers. I argued that 
workers who are promoted and transferred at the same time may suffer lower performance than 
other internal movers because of their lack of job-specific skills. That poor performance should 
leave those workers who are simultaneously promoted and transferred underrepresented at the 
top of the performance distribution, and therefore less likely to be promoted: 
 
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): Workers who are promoted and transferred at the same time will have 
slower rates of subsequent promotion than other internal movers. 
 
Similarly, the lower performance of workers who are promoted and transferred at the same time 
should leave them well represented in the lower tail of performers. That low performance may 
make them vulnerable to higher rates of involuntary exit: 
 
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): Workers who are promoted and transferred at the same time will have a 
higher rate of involuntary exit than other internal movers.   
 
A further form of worker mobility is voluntary exit. Prior research suggests that such exit can be 
affected by a poor match between workers and their job or organization, as well as by underlying 
individual propensities to leave jobs (Blumen, Kogan, and McCarthy, 1995; Chatman, 1991; 
Edwards, 1991; Farber, 1994). As noted above, external hires know less about the organization 
than do internal candidates and are at greater risk of forming a poor match (Halaby, 1988). Given 
that external hires have already left at least one other organization, they may also have a higher 
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average propensity to move to another firm, although such differences may be less marked in 
fields in which interorganizational mobility is common. Together, these factors lead me to 
predict: 
 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): External hires will have a higher rate of voluntary exit than internal movers. 
 
METHODS 
 
I tested the hypotheses using personnel data from the U.S. investment banking arm of a financial 
services institution, which I call “Croesus.” Investment banking represents an interesting context 
in which to study the effects of internal versus external mobility. Organizational performance in 
this industry often depends on the skills of the workforce, increasing the importance of personnel 
decisions. Workers in banking are also notoriously mobile, making this a context in which 
organizations regularly engage in external hiring at all levels. Finally, the hypotheses developed 
above apply to jobs with high levels of firm-specific skills; Groysberg, Lee, and Nanda,(2008) 
found that the performance of investment analysts who moved to a new firm fell substantially, 
suggesting that firm-specific skills are important in investment banking. 
 
Croesus is organized into four different business units, comprising one support unit and three 
different revenue-producing units. Each business unit is then divided into divisions, with a 
median size of 450 workers; divisions are further subdivided into departments, with a median 
size of 100; and each department is itself composed of different groups, with a median size of 32.  
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I have data on all Croesus employees from the year 2003 to 2009. These employees include both 
investment professionals, such as research analysts, advisors, and traders, as well as “back 
office” staff such as lawyers, information technology workers, and administrators. The data 
consist of annual records for each worker, giving details of his or her job and compensation in 
that year, annual performance data, and demographic data.  
 
Variables 
 
Mobility Variables. Internal mobility at Croesus took place through promotion to a higher rank 
or transfer to a different organizational unit. The employees at Croesus all occupied one of six 
different ranks, which were used across the organization and were central determinants of pay 
and responsibilities. Although titles vary across firms, the usual industry descriptions of these 
ranks (which I use here to preserve the anonymity of the site) are analyst/non-officer, associate, 
vice president (VP), director, managing director (MD), and senior executive.  
 
Promotions across ranks usually occurred as individuals demonstrated the skills necessary to 
operate in the rank above and almost always occurred once a year as part of the annual personnel 
process. Nonetheless, workers in different ranks would usually be expected to carry out 
significantly different tasks. In investment banking jobs, for example, industry experts report that 
it is usual for analysts to work for associates in carrying out analyses. VPs provide direction for 
those overall analyses and interact with the clients. Directors oversee deals and sell new work, 
while MDs focus on managing client relationships and overall strategy. Within trading, 
progression through the ranks involves becoming directly involved in trading, managing larger 
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portfolios of securities and more complex products, and ultimately managing a group and setting 
strategy. I identified promotions by a change in rank from one year to the next. 
 
Lateral transfers are defined as moves across organizational units (divisions, departments, or 
groups) between one year and the next. Because different units generally focused on different 
topic areas, such moves involve changes in the kinds of work that transfers do. I avoided 
confusing transfers with reorganizations, in which an individual might be doing the same work 
but in a differently labelled or constituted organizational unit, by restricting transfers to 
transitions accompanied by fewer than 10 per cent of the source unit’s workers and by fewer than 
10 per cent of the destination unit’s workers. 
 
I used dummy variables to code internal entry into the job into three categories: simple 
promotions (not accompanied by transfers), simple transfers (not accompanied by promotions), 
and combined promotions and transfers (both promotion and transfer occur during the same 
year). Entering a job by external hiring is the excluded category in the analyses. I verified that 
those jobs were entered by hiring based on the hire date provided by Croesus. When external 
hires then move into new jobs within the organization, they are recoded as entering those 
subsequent jobs by internal mobility. 
 
Indicators of observable ability. I measured indicators of observable ability with two variables 
that have been extensively used in labor economics: education and experience. Work experience 
provides workers with valuable work-related skills through on-the-job learning (Mincer, 1962). 
Education is also a commonly used indicator of ability, both because it provides workers with 
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useful knowledge and because it may signal cognitive ability (Spence, 1973). Although 
experience and education are weaker predictors of job performance than cognitive tests or 
structured interviews (Schmidt and Hunter, 1998), they are valuable proxies for underlying 
characteristics, are highly observable, and are well rewarded in the labor market as a 
consequence (Mincer, 1970; Dustmann and Meghir, 2005). 
 
The original dataset provided details of workers’ birthdates and their academic degrees. 
Education data were missing for around 3,300 of the 15,000 workers originally in the data. I was 
told that data were often missing due to failures by workers or administrators to fill in the field 
for education; it may also reflect some individuals lacking degrees. I dropped workers who 
lacked education data from the analysis. 
 
I created dummy variables for the highest degree that a worker possessed (bachelor’s, master’s 
or Ph.D.).  I then calculated experience using workers’ ages. I assumed that workers had been 
working since age 18 if they had no degree and added 4 years to this age for a bachelor’s degree, 
2 years for a master’s, and 4 for a Ph.D. (in the very few cases in which this resulted in negative 
experience, I reset it to zero). 
 
Performance. I used three measures from Croesus’s annual performance evaluations. 
Contribution was based on a 1-5 scale that assesses whether workers hit their performance 
targets for the year: 1 = “Objectives significantly exceeded,” 3 = “Objectives met,” and 5 = 
“Objectives not met.” Around 9 per cent of ratings are a 1, 56 per cent are a 2, 34 per cent are a 
3, 2 per cent are a 4, and .03 per cent are a 5.  Competence assesses a worker’s skills relative to 
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the requirements of the job. It was measured on a 1-5 scale, with 10 per cent of workers being 
awarded a 1 (the highest rating), 50 per cent receiving a 2, 37 per cent receiving a 3, 2 per cent 
receiving a 4, and .05 per cent receiving a 5. Performance rank is a forced ranking that is used to 
determine compensation and other personnel decisions and is intended to reflect both 
performance and overall value to the organization. Groups of managers rated many workers in 
the same rank to develop these rankings. The ranking splits workers into the top 10 per cent, the 
next 20 per cent, the next 60 per cent (in 2009, this segment was itself split into a higher 40 per 
cent and a lower 20 per cent), and the bottom 10 per cent. I converted this ranking into a 6 point 
scale, on which the 60 per cent category corresponded to a 4, and the divided category in 2009 
represented a 3 and a 5 respectively. 
 
I reversed the scales for each of the three performance measures so that higher values indicate 
better performance. Although I could have combined these three measures to form a single 
aggregate measure of performance, I chose to keep them separate, both because Cronbach’s 
alpha for a combined scale was marginal at .69 and because comparing these performance 
indicators can shed more light on the effects of mobility on performance. 
 
Although subjective performance evaluations can be biased (Cascio, 1998: 65-66), many 
researchers argue that such subjective evaluations are among the most valid measures of 
performance. Subjective measures often correct for determinants of performance outside the 
control of the individual (Campbell et al., 1993) and can encompass a wide variety of behaviors 
and outputs relevant to the job (Medoff and Abraham, 1981). Meta-analyses have shown high 
test-retest reliability in performance evaluations (Sturman, Cheramie, and Cashen, 2005), and 
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supervisory ratings are among the most common dependent variables in studies of performance 
(Sturman, 2003).  
 
Compensation. Croesus employees were paid a salary and an annual bonus that was based on 
both individual and firm performance. Bonuses represented 38 per cent of pay, on average, and 
rose as high as 98 per cent. I ran analyses on each pay component separately and on total 
compensation. I used the logarithm of each of these components because they are highly skewed 
(when individuals received zero bonus, I substituted a bonus of one dollar in order to calculate a 
log value). 
 
Exit. I coded exits into voluntary and involuntary exits based on a coding provided by Croesus. 
From 2006 onward, all exits were coded as “Employee Initiated,” “Croesus Initiated,” or 
“Neutral” (I restricted analyses to years after 2005 and omitted the 9 neutral exits). Of 10,952 
person-years analyzed, 1,135 ended in involuntary exit, and 1,118 ended in voluntary exit. 
 
Controls. The goal of the paper was to compare people being staffed in similar jobs through 
different routes. I therefore controlled for as many aspects of those jobs as possible. I included 
separate dummies for each of the six hierarchical ranks. I also used job titles and department and 
group names to create dummies for 13 different functions: administrator; Human Resources 
(HR); corporate management, marketing, legal, internal finance, operations, Information 
Technology (IT), research; sales; trading; advisory; and other banking roles. I also controlled for 
interactions between rank and function to allow the effect of rank to vary according to 
occupation. I controlled for the city that the job was in (88 per cent of workers were in the 
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greater New York area). Finally, I included dummies for workers’ departments to provide even 
more fine-grained controls for the kinds of work people were doing, but in some cases, analyses 
would not converge when controlling for departments. In those cases, I controlled for divisions. 
 
A particular concern is that unobserved factors that make the firm more likely to hire from 
outside might be correlated with pay or performance. For example, we would expect more hiring 
in those areas that have higher turnover or require new skills that the organization lacks. 
Although highly detailed job-level dummies should control for fixed propensities of different 
kinds of jobs to engage in more external hiring they may not capture over-time variation in 
propensity to hire. I therefore also controlled for the proportion of new hires in the worker’s 
group and the proportion of workers who left the worker’s group, as measured both in the year 
that his or her job started and in the current year. 
 
I included dummies for each year in the sample, reflecting changes in labor market conditions 
between 2002 and 2009. I also controlled for how long an individual had been in the job, 
measured in years. Although I had dates of entry for promotions and hires, I lacked these for 
transfers. I assumed the transfers entered their jobs in the middle of the year. Finally, I controlled 
for gender and ethnicity (Caucasian, Asian, and other). 
 
Final Sample 
 
I made a number of restrictions to the data. I dropped observations with missing education data, 
and with missing performance data, which occurred when workers had been hired too recently to 
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assess or were terminated before the evaluation. I explored whether the missing education or 
performance data might bias the results by rerunning analyses excluding these variables and 
using all data. The results were very similar to those using the restricted data set. I also excluded 
job spells in the lowest rank, which cannot be entered by promotion. I avoided sampling workers 
based on the length of their job spell by limiting the sample to jobs that began during or after 
2002 and for which I could observe the beginning date. I excluded 99 workers who met my other 
criteria but appeared in the data set long after they were hired, either because they transferred 
from elsewhere in the parent company or because they entered Croesus as part of a merger. 
 
The final data set contains information on 5,260 workers in 7,129 job spells. The median length 
of completed job spells was around two years for those that ended in promotion and around 1.5 
years for those ending in transfers or exits.  
 
RESULTS 
   Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 provides means, standard deviations, and correlations for the main dependent and 
independent variables. A year spent in a job is the unit of analysis. Of particular interest are the 
means for the different modes of job entry. Simple promotion is by far the most common mode 
of entry, representing 55 per cent of the observed job years. The next most common entry mode 
is external hiring, with 32 per cent of observations. Simple transfers represent only 10 per cent of 
observations, while combined transfers and promotions were very rare at the firm, providing the 
means of entering only 3 per cent of job years (statistics using job spells as the unit of analysis 
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were very similar). Internal mobility therefore outweighs hiring at Croesus, but that mobility is 
overwhelmingly vertical and within the same organizational unit.   
  Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Performance 
 
Table 2 presents analyses of each of the three performance measures. Because these are discrete, 
ordinal measures, I used ordered logit analyses. The unit of analysis is the job-year. I clustered 
the errors by individual to account for non-independence among the errors. The analyses did not 
converge fully when I controlled for departments and cities, so instead I controlled for divisions 
and whether the job was in the greater New York Area (ordinary least squares analyses produced 
very similar results when controlling for either division or department). Performance was scaled 
so that higher values always indicate better performance. I present models with and without 
interactions between mobility type and time in job and include tests for differences between 
internal movers. 
 
Two broad patterns emerge from the models. First, the two most common forms of internal 
mobility – simple promotion and simple transfers – lead to significantly higher initial 
performance than external hiring. The main coefficients in the full models (2, 4, and 6) indicate 
predicted performance on beginning the job, while the main coefficients in the reduced models 
(1, 3, and 5) indicate average performance over the full period in the job. Workers who entered 
the job through simple promotions perform better than external hires on all measures and in all 
specifications. Simple transfers also outperform external hires initially in all specifications (main 
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effects in models 2, 4, and 6) and over the full duration of the job using contribution, which is the 
performance measure most closely tied to objective results. The weaker effects for transfers in 
models 1 and 3 appear to reflect the lower numbers of simple transfers compared with simple 
promotions, rather than a rapid decay of their advantages.  Initial differences between external 
hires and workers who entered the job through combined promotions and transfers are much 
weaker, only attaining a 10 per cent significance level in model 6. 
 
Second, I find evidence that the performance of workers entering the job through combined 
promotions and transfers is weaker than other internal movers’.  I find significant differences 
between workers entering their jobs through simple promotions versus combined promotions and 
transfers in analyses of both ranked performance and contribution. It may be that workers who 
entered the job through combined promotions and transfers are seen as having the core skills 
required for their jobs but struggle to apply these skills in a new setting.  I also find differences in 
ranked performance between workers entering their jobs through simple transfers versus 
combined promotions and transfers. A lack of significant differences between these groups for 
the other measures may partly reflect a lack of statistical power, given the smaller number of 
workers in each of these categories. 
 
These results offer support for H1a and H1b, which argued that internal movers would perform 
better than hires and that workers entering jobs through combined promotions and transfers 
would perform worse than other internal movers. Though most internal movers do perform 
significantly better than hires, the performance penalty suffered by workers entering the job 
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through combined promotions and transfers is so large that it often renders their performance 
similar to external hires.  
 
Interactions between entry modes and time in job suggest that the advantages received by 
workers entering the job through simple promotions and simple transfers versus new hires 
decline over time. The magnitudes of the interaction coefficients indicate that the performance of 
external hires remains significantly weaker than that of workers entering the job through simple 
promotions for more than two years for contribution and competence, and slightly less than two 
years for ranked performance. In supplementary analyses, I created dummies for each year in the 
job and interacted these with the mobility dummies (results available from the author). I found 
that the performance of promoted workers was better than new hires for the first two years, after 
which the performance of the two groups converged. The performance of new hires was never 
significantly better than promoted workers. I found similar results when I also examined the 
performance of the workers in their subsequent jobs. 
 
This convergence in performance between new hires and internal movers most likely reflects the 
acquisition of firm-specific skills by new hires. I confirmed that this performance convergence 
was not due to attrition among the weaker hires by conducting individual fixed effects analyses 
(not reported here). The fixed-effects analyses produced similar interaction effects to the cross-
sectional analysis, suggesting that hires’ performance improvement is due to within-individual 
learning. A Heckman analysis, correcting for sample attrition using interactions between year 
and function as an instrument, gave very similar results to OLS and was not able to disconfirm 
the hypothesis that the selection and performance equations were independent.   
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Among the controls, I find higher performance ranks for men and white employees. Men do not 
have higher competence or contribution ratings, though. I also find that workers with less 
education and experience perform better. These results likely reflect selection effects: holding 
the position constant, workers  who reach that position at an earlier age and with less education 
are likely to have higher innate ability, which shows up as higher performance. 
 
Characteristics of External Hires versus Promoted Workers 
  Insert Table 3 about here 
 
I tested for differences in workers’ observable indicators of ability using a multinomial logit 
analysis, in which the dependent variable was mode of job entry and the unit of analysis was the 
job spell. The results are shown in table 3. This analysis cannot distinguish the determinants of 
selection into these jobs, because there is no information on the applicant pool from which the 
workers were picked (Fernandez and Sosa, 2005). In the absence of data on the applicant pools, 
however, these analyses can at least determine whether the characteristics of successful 
candidates for hiring and internal moves are consistent with my theory. Because external hiring 
is the excluded category, coefficients represent differences between the characteristics of internal 
movers and external hires. To achieve convergence, I controlled only for division rather than 
department. Chi-squared tests also indicated very poor fit for models including interactions 
between rank and function, so I excluded these interactions from the models. I also excluded 
controls for hiring and turnover at the current date, as I only included one observation per job 
spell. 
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Consistent with H2a, external hires are significantly more experienced than promoted workers 
(both simple and combined). External hires are also better educated than workers entering the job 
through simple promotions, being more likely to have completed every level of education. The 
large sizes of the standard errors on the education coefficients for simple transfers and combined 
transfers and promotions prevent us from making inferences about these differences. As 
predicted by H2b, transfers have more experience than workers entering the job through simple 
promotions (p <.013). There are no significant differences between the experience of transfers 
and external hires. I experimented with dropping workers from the second-lowest rank, in case 
the results reflected recruitment directly out of graduate programs at that level and the results 
were robust to this exclusion. 
 
Among the other worker characteristics, men are more likely to enter the job by external hiring 
than promotion, although the coefficient for simple promotions is only marginally significant 
(p<10).  
 
Pay 
  Insert Table 4 about here. 
 
Table 4 analyzes the determinants of compensation. Because I was concerned that pay would be 
more sensitive to the nature of the job than other outcomes, and because ordinary least squares 
does not present convergence problems in the presence of multiple controls, I used additional 
controls for all interactions between rank and division (I also experimented with controlling for 
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group, but this had little effect on the estimates). Because workers who had been at Croesus less 
than a year would likely receive a lower bonus, I controlled for the number of days in that year 
since the worker was hired (maximum value of 365) and whether he or she was terminated 
during the year. I also controlled for performance and general human capital, although the results 
were very similar when these controls were excluded. Table 4 examines the determinants of log 
salary, log bonus, and log total compensation. 
 
The results provide substantial support for H3a. All internal movers received significantly lower 
salaries than external hires (models 1 and 2). Internal movers also received lower total 
compensation than external hires when looking across all observations (model 5), although 
simple transfers did not have lower total compensation in their first year (model 6). The lack of a 
significant coefficient on simple transfers, however, may be a statistical artefact. Although the 
interaction between simple transfers and time in job is non-significant, interpretation of the 
coefficients suggests that simple transfers would have lower pay than external hires in all years 
except their first one. Workers entering their jobs through both simple promotions and combined 
promotions and transfers also receive lower bonuses than external hires. 
 
The results also support H3b. Simple transfers have significantly higher salaries and total 
compensation than other internal movers (models 1, 2, 5, and 6). They also have higher initial 
bonuses (main effect in model 4). 
 
The overall magnitudes of the effects are also large. Initially, workers entering their jobs through 
simple promotions receive salaries and total compensation that are around 15 per cent lower than 
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external hires. The interaction coefficient with time in job suggests that the salaries of simple 
promotions would only catch up with external hires after seven years – a longer time span than 
almost anyone is present within the data – and that their total compensation would never 
converge with external hires’.  
 
Among the controls, measures of group hiring and turnover have positive effects on pay. Results 
also show positive effects of indicators of ability (experience, Master’s and Ph.D.’s) on salary, 
but negative effects on bonus, consistent with their effects on performance. When I dropped job-
level controls (not reported here), I found positive, significant effects of experience and 
education on all components of pay.  
 
I explored whether the higher pay of external hires might reflect labor market conditions. Baker, 
Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994b) found that the pay of continuing workers within a firm responded 
less to market forces than the pay of new hires. Rapid increases in market pay during the period 
of the study might then have affected the wage differential. The very high correlation between 
year of entry and mode of entry prevented me from simply controlling for when workers entered 
the firm. Instead, I compared trends in the pay given to new hires versus continuing workers 
(results available from the author) and found that continuing workers’ compensation actually 
varied more from year to year than did the compensation of new hires. This analysis suggests 
that external labor market changes do not drive the pay premium. 
 
Subsequent Mobility 
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I analyzed the determinants of subsequent promotions and exits at Croesus using Cox event 
history models. The time that an individual is in a specific job is treated as a unique case, during 
which the worker remains at risk of promotion or exit. I treated promotion, exit, and transfers as 
competing risks; for each analysis, exits from the data for any cause other than the focal one 
were classified as censored events (Allison, 1984). I also used slightly different samples for 
analysis of terminations versus promotions. For the promotion analyses, I dropped observations 
that were not at risk of promotion because they were in the top two ranks (I never observed 
promotion out of those ranks) or in the final year of the data. For the exit analyses, I dropped 
data from before 2006 because of problems with Croesus’s coding in prior years. The exit 
analyses also used performance data from the year prior to termination, because workers did not 
receive performance rankings in the year of their termination. I also included dummies for 
division but not department in the exit analyses– analyses using department dummies gave 
similar results but were less stable.  The models are presented in table 5. For each outcome, I 
present models with and without performance variables. Analyses that excluded salary and 
demographic variables showed somewhat stronger effects of the mobility variables.  
  Insert Table 5 about here. 
 
Consistent with H4a, I find that external hires are promoted more rapidly than workers who had 
entered the job through simple promotions. I find no support for H4b, that workers entering the 
job through combined promotions and transfers have even slower rates of promotion; instead, 
their rates are slightly higher than those of workers entering through simple promotions. I also 
find that simple transfers have the highest promotion rates. This result may reflect the experience 
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that such transfers have already accrued in their rank. If transfers can demonstrate performance 
in their new job, their experience may allow them to be promoted more rapidly than others. 
 
In developing H4a, I argued that new hires would have higher performance variance than 
internal movers. I tested this assumption by exploring the distribution of performance scores for 
hires versus internal movers. I found that hires were much more likely than internal movers to 
receive below median performance ratings, but only slightly less likely to receive the highest 
performance category relative to the median. These results confirmed that hires’ lower average 
performance reflected a disproportionate likelihood of their being poor performers, rather than 
uniformly lower performance across the distribution. I was not able to find evidence, though, that 
hires were actually overrepresented at the top of the performance distribution. This may in part 
reflect the relatively crude nature of the performance measures.  
 
Results also show strong support for H5a and H6.  External hires have higher involuntary and 
voluntary exit rates than workers entering the job through either simple promotions or combined 
promotions and transfers. External hires have around a 61 per cent higher hazard rate of 
involuntary exit than workers entering through simple promotions, and a 21 per cent higher 
hazard rate of voluntary exit (models 3 and 5). Performance explains a substantial amount of the 
effect of job entry on all forms of exit and fully mediates the effects of simple promotion on 
voluntary exit rates. This finding suggests that the increased voluntary exit of hires reflects 
problems of firm-specific skills and fit, rather than a higher fixed propensity to turn over. 
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Results show no significant support for H5b; in fact, involuntary exit rates for workers entering 
the job through combined promotions and transfers are significantly lower than those of other 
internal movers. By contrast, involuntary exit rates for simple transfers are significantly higher 
than those for workers entering the job by simple promotions (p<.000 in model 3) and higher 
than external hires before performance controls. It is possible that this higher exit rate reflects the 
process by which individuals became transfers. In supplementary analyses, I found that transfers 
had previously had much lower performance evaluations than those remaining in their jobs. Such 
a history of poor performance likely leaves transfers vulnerable to involuntary exits. 
 
One concern is that some voluntary exits may reflect workers being counselled to leave. Croesus 
coded the reasons for voluntary exits into 23 categories. Of the reasons given, those most likely 
to reflect signals from management were the roughly 25 per cent of exits that occurred because 
of dissatisfaction with career development or promotion opportunities.  I conducted a robustness 
check by dropping these exits and rerunning the analyses. I found the same results. I also reran 
the analyses using a competing risk regression model, which assumes that the observations that 
fail from a competing risk would never fail from the focal cause (Fine and Gray, 1999). The 
results were somewhat weaker, reflecting the increased representation of external hires in all 
classes of failure, but continued to support the hypotheses. 
 
Supplementary Analysis: Source of Hires 
 
Although this paper focuses on differences between external hires and internal movers, analyses 
can shed further light on the underlying mechanisms by examining the effects of different 
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sources of hires. For example, I argued that new hires are paid more because they and the firm 
have less information about each other. Workers hired through sources that can provide more 
reliable information to each party should then receive lower pay than other hires. In particular, 
we would expect that workers brought in through employee referrals would have the most 
information about their potential match with the job, because internal contacts are more likely to 
provide applicants with rich information about the proposed job, and firms and applicants may 
be more likely to trust that information (Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore, 2000; Castilla, 2005). A 
corollary of the above arguments is therefore that workers hired through employee referrals 
should have lower pay. Looking at the source of hire can also shed light on the influence of 
adverse selection. There is a concern that new hires may be disproportionately those workers 
who were unsuccessful in their previous jobs and may even have been laid off. We might 
therefore expect that workers hired through unsolicited applications are more likely to perform 
poorly than those hired through a headhunter, who are more likely to be poached from current 
jobs. 
 
The data provided by Croesus included the referral source for the hire of each worker (although 
these data were missing for 848 workers). Of the workers with source-of hire-data, 785 were 
referred by an employee, 624 were intermediated hires, through an employment agency or 
executive search firm, 407 were hired following unsolicited applications, 64 were hired through 
an Internet application, 50 came from temporary jobs, and 18 were former employees. I dropped 
the 33 workers who entered through mergers or mass hires of business and categories with fewer 
than 15 workers to simplify the analysis. I analyzed determinants of performance and pay for 
these external hires using the same specifications as the comparisons of external hires and 
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internal movers, but restricting the analyses to external hires for whom I had hiring source data.  
  Insert Table 6 about here. 
 
Performance analyses are reported in table 6. The first model shows performance relative to 
employee referrals, while the second model compares employee referrals and all other hires. The 
results show that intermediated hires performed worse than either employee referrals or 
unsolicited hires. This is the opposite of what adverse selection might predict, because 
intermediated hires are among the least likely to have been already looking for a job due to poor 
performance. Instead, the result raises the possibility that Croesus may place too much trust in its 
intermediaries, underestimating the challenges that their candidates will face. Employee referrals 
have significantly higher-ranked performance than other hires, but differences are not significant 
for other measures. I also find that former employees are rated lower on competence than other 
workers. This result suggests that firm-specific skills may decay during time spent away from the 
organization.  
  Insert Table 7 about here. 
 
Table 7 analyzes the effects of different hiring routes on how workers were paid. For each 
measure, I again present results relative to employee referrals (the first two models) and relative 
to all other categories (the third model). The results show that employee referrals received less 
total compensation than other hires. The differences versus intermediated hires are particularly 
significant. Results for salary and bonus are weaker, although intermediated hires receive 
significantly more salary than employee referrals.  
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Although the findings are not consistent across all components of pay, the results for total 
compensation are consistent with an effect of information on external hires’ pay premium. When 
external hires have access to information through internal contacts at the organization, they 
accept the job for less total compensation. This finding is also interesting in its own right: some 
studies have suggested that workers hired through their personal networks receive higher pay 
than others, although other work has questioned these results (see Mouw, 2003 for a detailed 
discussion). I find that referrals actually receive lower pay, once the nature of the job is held 
constant.   
 
It is also interesting to note that the total pay for unsolicited hires is not significantly different 
from intermediated hires (p < .18 in model 8), although there are differences in salary. I would 
expect that unsolicited hires were less happy in their current jobs than intermediated hires, given 
that unsolicited hires made the initial move to contact Croesus (Lee and Mitchell, 1994). It is 
possible that some of those unsolicited hires were even laid off. Negotiation theory suggests that 
workers’ pay is shaped in part by the value of their alternatives (Bazerman and Neale, 1992); we 
would therefore expect that unsolicited hires would receive lower pay than intermediated hires, 
but the observed differences are very small. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
As firms increasingly use both external hiring and internal mobility to staff higher-level jobs, we 
need to understand whether these different forms of worker mobility lead to different 
employment outcomes. To do so, this paper bridges theories of internal and external labor market 
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matching, arguing that the routes by which workers enter jobs affects both the specific skills that 
workers bring with them and the information available to match those workers to jobs. Results 
show that external hires have worse performance than internal movers while being paid 
substantially more. Compared with workers entering a job through simple promotion, the most 
common form of internal mobility, external hires receive significantly lower performance 
evaluations for their first two years in the job yet are initially paid around 18 per cent more. 
Hires also have much higher rates of exit from the job but, if they stay, faster subsequent 
promotion.  
 
The results also showed that employment outcomes depend on how individuals move within the 
organization, as the nature of the prior job shapes the resources that workers bring to their new 
position. Workers who are simultaneously promoted and transferred have lower performance 
than other kinds of internal movers, consistent with the gap between the specific skills that they 
bring with them and those that they need for their new job. Lateral transfers have higher 
experience and pay than other internal movers as well as higher rates of subsequent promotion 
and exit. Those effects likely reflect the transfers’ accrued experience at a higher organizational 
rank, as well as the selection of poorly performing workers for transfers. These results advance 
our knowledge of how hiring competes with internal mobility, as well as the consequences of 
different mobility paths within the labor market.  
 
Performance, Skills, and Mobility 
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The results demonstrate how the way that workers enter their jobs affects their subsequent 
performance. Both new hires and those who are simultaneously promoted and transferred 
initially perform significantly worse than other workers. New hires’ performance converges with 
that of internal movers over three years, suggesting that the new hires are not systematically less 
able than those promoted to the job. Instead, the evidence suggests that hires and workers who 
are simultaneously promoted and transferred must learn new specific skills before they can 
perform as well as the other internal movers, who already have those skills.  
 
The performance gap between hires and internal movers is particularly interesting given the 
differences in their observable characteristics: hires have more experience and education yet still 
perform worse than workers entering the job through simple promotions and simple transfers. 
That lower initial performance underlines the importance of both firm-specific skills and 
unobservable attributes in shaping performance, even in a setting in which interfirm mobility is 
very common. 
 
One concern in interpreting the performance results is that the measures could be affected by 
supervisory bias. Although I lack objective performance data, there is variation in how the 
performance measures reflect objective outcomes. Although competence measures are largely 
subjective, contribution tracks the more concrete achievement of objectives. As table 2 revealed, 
results were actually stronger for the more objective contribution measure than for the 
competence or performance rank measures. Similarly, performance in some jobs is based on 
clearly measurable outcomes; in particular, traders and salespeople have clearly measurable 
performance in terms of profit and revenue. Supplementary analyses showed that performance 
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differences between workers entering jobs through promotions and external hires were slightly 
greater for traders and salespeople, not weaker as we would expect if differences were driven by 
subjective biases. These results suggest that supervisory biases may actually minimize 
differences between internal movers and external hires. Those biases may reflect an escalation of 
commitment following a manager’s decision to hire a worker (Schoorman, 1988) and are 
consistent with evidence that objective performance measures are more sensitive to 
organizational tenure than subjective measures (Sturman, 2003).   
 
The findings showing that external hires perform worse than internal movers run contrary to 
predictions based on tournament theory. Chan (1996) suggested that firms’ reluctance to weaken 
internal incentives by substituting hiring for promotion would lead them to hire only workers 
who were expected to perform substantially better than the workers they would promote. The 
higher observable human capital and faster rates of promotion of external hires observed in other 
studies has been used to support this theory (Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom, 1994a; Chan, 2006; 
Oyer, 2007). Though I replicated the prior results about promotion rates and observable human 
capital, I found that hires have a significantly lower average performance than workers promoted 
into the job. This result suggests that the stronger observable human capital and faster promotion 
of external hires reflect the need to compensate for their lower and less certain unobservable 
skills, not their higher overall ability. 
 
The results also show that the performance effects of internal mobility depend on the nature of 
that mobility. The overwhelming majority of internal moves in my sample, both simple 
promotions and simple transfers, resulted in higher initial performance than hiring. The superior 
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performance of simple transfers compared with external hires suggests that the performance 
advantages of workers who entered jobs through simple promotions are not a consequence of 
their remaining in exactly the same job: simple transfers have performance similar to promoted 
workers, despite moving to a different part of the organization. This strong performance of 
simple transfers is particularly noteworthy, given that those transfers usually followed poor 
performance in a prior role.  
 
I did find, though, that the 5 per cent of internal moves that combined promotions and transfers 
led to performance that was little better than external hires. One interpretation of the 
performance similarities between hires and workers entering the job by combined promotions 
and transfers is that the kinds of skills that we think of as firm-specific are highly job-specific 
too. Radical job moves inside the organization may be as disruptive to working relationships and 
critical job knowledge as moves to another firm. An alternative interpretation is that internal 
moves to very different jobs require workers to develop different skills from external hires. If 
new hires usually come from similar roles in other organizations, they may experience less 
change in much of their work content than do the workers entering jobs by combined promotions 
and transfers. It may be that the need to learn the content of a new kind of job has similar 
consequences for performance as the loss of firm-specific skills.  
 
The two hypotheses that were not supported were H4b and H5b, which suggested that workers 
entering their jobs through combined promotions and transfers would have lower rates of 
promotion and higher rates of involuntary exit than other internal movers. The lack of support for 
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those hypotheses may reflect managers’ recognition of the difficulties involved in making such 
complex moves and their forebearance during personnel decisions. 
 
Incomplete Information, Worker Characteristics and Pay 
 
The results also demonstrate how differences between hiring and internal mobility can affect the 
characteristics of workers entering jobs through those routes, and their subsequent pay. The 
findings are consistent with two pathways through which incomplete information affects hires’ 
pay: external hires have stronger observable indicators of ability, which should raise the wages 
that they command; there is also evidence that external hires’ poorer expected fit with their jobs 
may increase their pay. Farber and Gibbons (1996) argued that pay differentials due to indicators 
of human capital should be constant over time, as those indicators reflect differences in workers’ 
value to employers. That external hires’ salary premium declines over time therefore suggests 
that this premium may not be due solely to their higher externally observable indicators of 
ability. External hires’ higher turnover and termination rates also provide strong evidence of their 
poorer fit with their jobs, suggesting that they should demand higher wages than those who were 
promoted. The fact that employees’ referrals received lower total compensation than other hires 
is also consistent with workers demanding less pay when they know more about the job, 
although results for salary and bonus were not significant. 
 
These findings on hires’ compensation extend Harris and Helfat’s (1997) research on CEO labor 
markets. Their cross-firm study found that externally hired CEOs were paid more than internally 
promoted CEOs. I show that this phenomenon holds for workers being hired into similar jobs 
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within the same organization and that it occurs despite a large performance gap between the 
external hires and promoted workers. I also shed new light on the mechanism behind this effect. 
While Harris and Helfat suggest that the pay premium for external CEOs reflects demands for 
scarce specialist skills and the need to compensate hires for a loss of firm-specific skills, I 
provide evidence that the pay premium also reflects a need for hires to have stronger general 
observable attributes and the risk that they may be a poor fit for their new job. 
 
I also found that levels of observable characteristics and pay varied systematically across 
different kinds of internal movers. In particular, transfers had significantly more experience than 
did those promoted, as well as higher pay, promotion, and involuntary exit rates. These 
differences between transfers and promoted workers likely reflect the increased time that 
transfers have spent in the higher levels of the firm, experience that translates into higher pay and 
improved prospects for promotion. It is possible that some of these results could also reflect the 
specific way that transfers were used in this organization: supplementary analyses confirmed that 
lateral transfers usually followed poor performance in a prior role, suggesting that the transfers 
provided a second chance to those who were struggling in their existing positions. Such use of 
transfers to find improved fit would explain the increased rate of both promotions and exits for 
transfers: when transfers do well in a new position, they appear to be promoted rapidly; when 
they struggle, they are swiftly terminated. These findings raise the question, though, of why the 
organization gives transfers a second chance, given the costs of doing so. My other findings 
suggest an answer: though transfers were more expensive than promoted workers, they had both 
higher performance and lower costs than the external hires who were their potential 
replacements.  
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Implications for Theory and Future Research 
 
The findings of this paper could be developed in a number of ways. First, future research should 
explore how the results from this single site generalize elsewhere. One important influence on 
the generalizability of the results is likely to be the demands for firm-specific skills in different 
jobs and organizations, especially because an untested corollary of my arguments is that 
performance differences between hires and promoted workers will increase as demands for firm-
specific skills increase. Although workers in investment banking are notoriously mobile, prior 
work has indicated that firm-specific skills are important in this setting (Groysberg, et Lee, and 
Nanda, 2008). Performance differences between hires and promoted workers should be lower in 
settings with fewer demands for firm-specific skills.  
 
Similarly, the effects of promotion versus hiring should depend in part on the nature of 
promotion. At Croesus, almost all promotions involve some measure of continuity with the prior 
job. Evidence from other studies suggests that such rank promotions are the norm in the broader 
labor market (Pergamit and Veum, 1999). The results of this study should therefore generalize to 
other settings, particularly those involving professional work in which responsibilities accrete 
gradually. Performance differences between hires and promoted workers should be lower in 
settings in which promotions involve greater changes in task content. 
 
I conducted a partial exploration of how the findings might generalize by exploring their 
applicability across occupations and organizations. I carried out separate analyses on the 
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investment professionals (traders, salespeople, research analysts, and investment bankers) versus 
support staff at Croesus to check that the findings were not being driven by a particular 
occupational group. For the core findings of pay and performance I found consistent, significant 
results in each of these two groups, with the one exception of total compensation for simple 
transfers, which was higher among support staff. Second, I replicated the analyses in two other 
firms: an investment bank and a publishing company, although the less detailed data provided by 
these firms did not enable me to conduct all of the analyses here. In both cases, I found the same 
effects of paying more for external hires while providing them with lower performance ratings. 
 
Future research should address when firms choose to fill jobs through hiring versus internal 
mobility. In part, such research could address concerns about the endogeneity of staffing 
decisions, which might bias the results of this paper if factors that correlated with decisions to 
hire also correlate with pay or performance. I dealt with this issue in part by using very detailed 
controls for different jobs, including the levels of hiring and turnover in each group. These 
controls allowed me to hold constant a wide variety of measurable characteristics of the job, 
comparing workers who are hired and promoted into very similar jobs. A natural experiment or 
valid instrumental variable would provide a more robust approach to assessing causality. 
Although I was not able to find such an instrument in this study, the use of one would contribute 
to this research in the future.  
 
A better understanding of the reasons for hiring would also be particularly interesting, given the 
high costs and poor performance of new hires documented here. It is possible that hiring reflects 
the difficulties of staffing all jobs by promotion (Cappelli, 2008), perhaps because the work 
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requires relatively low ratios of junior workers to senior workers or because demands for 
particular kinds of workers are growing very rapidly. Alternatively, the firm might be prepared to 
accept poorer average performance from external hires if they receive disproportionate benefits 
from those few hires that turn out to have very high performance. Evidence from supplementary 
analyses (not reported here) suggests that firms are not hiring to find a few “stars,” though, as 
hiring was less likely in positions with more variation in individual performance, which are also 
the positions for which stars should be most valuable.  
 
It would also be valuable to gather data on the jobs that external hires had come from, to 
establish whether their jobs had been at the same rank as the one that they entered at Croesus and 
whether they had been working in the same area as their new job. The similar experience of 
transfers and new hires suggests that external hires may be coming from similar levels in other 
organizations. My interviews also suggested that the organization was more likely to hire from a 
parallel level: experience at a similar level was an important indicator of ability to the firm; while 
Croesus might be willing to let an internal candidate learn the skills needed to operate in a new 
rank or area, external hires would be expected to have demonstrated relevant experience already.  
 
A further important area for future study is the application of these ideas to gender and racial 
differences within organizations. I explored how problems of incomplete information led to 
differences between hires and internal movers in the achieved characteristics of experience and 
education. Much other research has explored how ascriptive characteristics such as race and 
gender are also used as indicators in hiring (Phelps, 1972; Heilman, 1980; Petersen and Saporta, 
2004). Gender in particular may play an important role in employers’ inferences when jobs  
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correspond to gender stereotypes (Cejka and Eagly, 1999), as is the case in investment banking 
(Groysberg, 2010). Gender and race differ substantially from experience and education, in that 
they do not relate directly to workers’ productivity. Nonetheless, when employers use such 
characteristics as indicators of ability, we might expect to see gender and racial differences in 
how workers enter jobs. I found some evidence that women are more likely to enter jobs through 
promotion rather than external hiring, consistent with the findings of Petersen and Saporta (2004) 
(but see Gorman and Kmec, 2009). Given the absence of data on both internal and external 
applicant pools (Fernandez and Sosa, 2005), however these results should be interpreted with 
caution. To the extent that women are less likely to reach higher-level jobs through external 
hiring, though, the results of this study have implications for overall gender inequality, because 
hires are better paid than internal movers. Further exploration of the way that indicators such as 
race and gender are used in promotion versus hiring decisions could therefore form a valuable 
extension to this research.  
 
The findings of this study contribute to internal labor market theory by showing how the 
allocation of jobs and rewards in organizations is affected by hiring into higher levels. A central 
focus of internal labor market theory has always been to explain the patterns of pay and mobility 
in organizations (Stewman, 1986; Osterman, 1987; Althauser, 1989), yet this literature’s focus 
on internal mobility has precluded detailed analysis of how external labor markets penetrate 
these structures. I contribute to this literature by showing that outcomes and mobility in internal 
labor markets can vary substantially based on whether workers were hired, promoted, or 
transferred into their current jobs. Such a finding is particularly important as firms become more 
open to external hiring.  
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The study also has implications for research on interorganizational careers (Arthur and 
Rousseau, 1996; Brett and Stroh, 1997). Building on Granovetter (1981), I show that how 
workers arrive in a position has important consequences for their careers, driving both their pay 
and future prospects. The results emphasize that cross-firm moves represent a double-edged 
sword for workers: holding the nature of the job constant, those who enter a job from outside 
receive higher pay but face a higher risk of termination. The results also provide a window into 
when people choose to build inter- or intraorganizational careers by showing how workers with 
stronger indicators of observable ability are better able to reach higher-level jobs externally.  
 
Perhaps most importantly, the paper provides unique evidence on the value to firms of internal 
labor market structures. Results show that internal mobility allows the firm to staff higher-level 
jobs with workers who have better performance but are paid less. These results provide further 
insight into the effects of turnover on organizational performance (Glebbeek and Bax, 2004; 
Shaw, Gupta, and Delery, 2005) by specifying some of the costs of external hiring. They also 
contribute to debates on the functions of internal labor markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; 
Jacoby, 1985; Althauser, 1989; Cappelli, 2000) by providing unique evidence that workers 
promoted into jobs via the internal labor market do in fact have higher levels of firm-specific 
skills. The paper also identifies a novel benefit of internal labor markets - lowering wage costs 
by reducing the uncertainty that firms and workers face in the matching process. By detailing the 
strong advantages of internal mobility over external hires, these findings help to explain the 
continued resilience of internal labor markets in the face of pressures for worker mobility. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Key Variables* 
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Simple promotion .55 .50 
                  2. Promotion/transfer .03 .18 -.20 
                 3. Simple transfer .10 .30 -.37 -.06 
                4. Experience 14.82 6.90 -.12 -.07 .13 
               5. Highest bachelor’s .53 .50 .08 .03 .02 -.08 
              6. Highest Master’s .37 .48 -.04 -.03 -.02 .02 -.81 
             7. Highest Ph.D. .08 .27 -.08 -.01 -.01 .02 -.31 -.23 
            
8. 
Ranked 
performance 3.74 1.35 .08 -.01 -.04 -.15 .03 -.03 .01 
           9. Contribution 3.72 .65 .12 0 -.03 -.08 .01 0 -.01 .56 
          10. Competence 3.71 .70 .07 .01 -.04 -.13 -.01 .01 .01 .52 .54 
         
11. 
Log total 
compensation 12.56 .88 .03 -.04 -.05 .12 -.13 .11 .06 .18 .22 .24 
        12. Log bonus 10.74 3.60 .05 0 -.04 -.04 -.06 .05 .05 .16 .2 .2 .63 
       13. Log salary 11.72 .26 -.19 -.07 .05 .43 -.19 .12 .15 .06 .05 .02 .62 .21 
      14. Time in job 1.76 1.14 .13 -.01 -.15 .24 0 .01 -.01 .09 .08 .05 .09 -.05 .19 
     15. Year 2007 1.76 -.02 .04 .08 .11 .02 -.01 -.02 .04 .01 -.04 -.17 -.33 .18 .26 
    16. Rank   3.02 .98 .06 -.04 .01 .41 -.12 .09 .09 .03 .08 .04 .68 .27 .81 .14 .03 
   17. Male .77 .42 -.02 -.01 -.01 .01 -.04 .05 -.02 .02 0 .03 .22 .08 .17 -.01 -.05 .14 
  18. White .78 .41 .06 0 .02 .14 .09 -.09 -.02 .04 .04 .04 .13 .1 .11 .07 -.07 .2 .04 
 19. Asian .16 .37 -.05 0 -.03 -.14 -.1 .1 .02 -.03 -.02 -.02 -.11 -.08 -.07 -.06 .07 -.17 -.04 -.84 
 
 
*Unit of analysis is a year spent in a job.  Each observation contains pay in that year, and most recent performance evaluation. 
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Table 2. Ordered Logit Analyses of Performance.* 
Dependent Variable Ranked performance Competence Contribution 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Time in job  .232 .387 0.163 0.233 0.198 0.408 
 
(.020) (.038) (0.019) (0.036) (0.019) (0.038) 
Group turnover proportion at hire .019 -.087 -0.171 -0.22 -0.211 -0.355 
 
(.22) (.214) (0.205) (0.206) (0.237) (0.234) 
Group new hire proportion at hire .325 .243 0.480 0.440 0.497 0.384 
 
(.154) (.156) (0.158) (0.159) (0.168) (0.169) 
Group new hire proportion   -.176 .036 -0.281 -0.181 -0.344 -0.058 
 
(.126) (.132) (0.132) (0.139) (0.135) (0.140) 
Group turnover proportion   -.346 -.297 0.007 0.032 0.087 0.165 
 
(.176) (.175) (.170) (.170) (.184) (.182) 
Experience -.078 -.076 -.046 -.046 -.051 -.051 
 
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Male .109 .109 .034 .034 .005 .003 
 
(.052) (.052) (.055) (.055) (.055) (.055) 
Asian .054 .057 .195 .196 .208 .215 
 
(.104) (.105) (.110) (.110) (.115) (.116) 
White .267 .272 .304 .306 .305 .315 
 
(.096) (.097) (.099) (.099) (.105) (.106) 
Highest Bachelor’s -.165 -.18 -.318 -.325 -.352 -.374 
 
(.154) (.154) (.144) (.144) (.140) (.140) 
Highest Master’s -.257 -.271 -.417 -.423 -.438 -.457 
 
(.156) (.156) (.147) (.148) (.143) (.143) 
Highest Ph.D. -.187 -.194 -.17 -.174 -.397 -.410 
 
(.176) (.176) (.168) (.169) (.169) (.169) 
Simple promotion .168 .509 .148 .308 .427 .893 
 (.054) (.072) (.054) (.077) (.055) (.077) 
Promotion and transfer -.122 .073 .071 .138 .182 .343 
 (.119) (.156) (.120) (.188) (.130) (.180) 
Simple transfer .115 .386 .146 .258 .238 .612 
 (.073) (.096) (.074) (.100) (.074) (.099) 
Simple prom x Time in job 
 
-.218  -.101  -.297 
  
(.042)  (.041)  (.042) 
Prom. and transfer x Time in job 
 
-.125  -.041  -.094 
  
(.096)  (.117)  (.117) 
Simple transfer x Time in job 
 
-.191  -.076  -.265 
  
(.064)  (.063)  (.062) 
Cut 1 -2.236 -2.011 -8.244 -8.145 -7.282 -6.993 
 
(.405) (.412) (.606) (.610) (.731) (.735) 
Cut 2 -1.771 -1.546 -4.249 -4.150 -2.887 -2.599 
 
(.405) (.412) (.445) (.449) (.445) (.451) 
Cut 3 .839 1.070 -.706 -.605 .762 1.064 
 
(.405) (.412) (.441) (.446) (.442) (.448) 
Cut 4 1.184 1.416 2.049 2.150 3.906 4.217 
 
(.405) (.413) (.441) (.446) (.448) (.455) 
Cut 5 2.709 2.945     
 
(.407) (.414)     
Observations 14,515 14,515 14,515 14,515 14,515 14,515 
Log pseudo-likelihood -20254.1 -20231.1 -14255 -14250 -13436 -13398 
Chi-squared 13335 13269 8909 8901 7934 7930 
Degrees of Freedom 123 126 122 125 122 125 
Probability .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
Prob vs. prior model  .0000 .0000 .0979 .0000 .0000 
P(simple prom. vs. prom. & transfer) .01 .004 .50 .35 .05 .002 
P(simple transfer vs. prom. & transfer) .06 .05 .55 .53 .68 .14 
Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual. All analyses also include 
dummies for rank, function, interactions between each rank and function, division, year, and 
greater New York area.
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Table 3. Multinominial Logit Analysis of the Determinants of Mode of Job Entry (N= 7346)* 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Simple promotion Simple transfer 
Promotion and 
transfer Simple promotion Simple transfer 
Promotion and 
transfer 
       Group turnover proportion at job 
entry 9.863 12.00 9.395 9.659 12.03 9.127 
 
(.371) (1.529) (.589) (.373) (1.586) (.595) 
Group new hire proportion at job 
entry -7.158 .715 -3.826 -7.050 .987 -3.742 
 
(.281) (1.180) (.549) (.283) (1.201) (.546) 
White 
   
.143 -.257 .281 
    
(.134) (.804) (.290) 
Asian 
   
-.014 -.572 -.0743 
    
(.148) (.920) (.320) 
Male 
   
-.134 -.111 -.362 
    
(.079) (.484) (.160) 
Experience 
   
-.0540 .034 -.079 
    
(.0058) (.030) (.014) 
Highest Bachelor’s 
   
-.745 -.614 .077 
    
(.246) (1.157) (.660) 
Highest Master’s 
   
-1.247 -.858 -.368 
    
(.249) (1.177) (.666) 
Highest Ph.D. 
   
-1.689 -.692 -.905 
    
(.273) (1.226) (.724) 
Log likelihood -4678 
  
-4338 
  Chi-squared 2364 
  
3316 
  Degrees of freedom 324 
  
345 
  Probability .0000   .0000   
Probability versus prior model 
(likelihood ratio) 
   
.0000 
  *Standard errors in parentheses. All analyses include dummies for rank, function, division, year, and city. Base case is entry by hiring. 
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Table 4: OLS Regressions of Determinants of Pay (N=14,515)* 
Dependent Variable Log Salary Log Bonus Log Total Compensation 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Full time 1.042 1.048 1.181 1.234 1.065 1.076 
 
(.145)  (.145) (.621) (.624) (.182) (.183) 
Terminated during year .0118 .0106 -9.680 -9.685 -.367 -.368 
 
(.0171) (.0171) (.237) (.236) (.0611) (.0609) 
Days since hiring (max 365) -.0002 -.00005 .0009 .0014 .0001 .0002 
 
(.00003) (.00003) (.0006) (.0007) (.0001) (.0001) 
Group turnover proportion at entry -.0128 -.0053 -.0317 -.0001 -.0153 -.0077 
 
(.0130) (.0129) (.241) (.241) (.0471) (.0466) 
Group hiring proportion at entry .0166 .0188 -.152 -.144 .0303 .032 
 
(.0101) (.0100) (.167) (.167) (.0326) (.0325) 
Group hiring proportion   .0227 .013 .428 .396 .0709 .0634 
 
(.0084) (.0083) (.197) (.199) (.032) (.0326) 
Group turnover proportion .0282 .0265 -.339 -.344 -.0957 -.0971 
 
(.0097) (.0096) (.258) (.257) (.0412) (.0410) 
Time in job .0162 -.001 -.0387 -.0839 .0358 .0243 
 
(.0011) (.0022) (.0239) (.0552) (.00455) (.0113) 
Experience .0027 .0027 -.0095 -.0096 -.0024 -.0024 
 
(.0003) (.0003) (.0038) (.0038) (.0008) (.0008) 
Male .0176 .0175 -.0391 -.0403 .0711 .0708 
 
(.0037) (.0037) (.0436) (.0436) (.01) (.01) 
Asian .0076 .0076 .0154 .0166 -.0102 -.0099 
 
(.0064) (.0064) (.0908) (.0906) (.0183) (.0181) 
White -.0026 -.0028 .0324 .0332 -.0360 -.0358 
 
(.0059) (.0059) (.0808) (.0806) (.0171) (.0170) 
Highest Bachelor’s .0090 .0096 -.217 -.219 -.0521 -.0527 
 
(.0116) (.0117) (.132) (.132) (.0273) (.0274) 
Highest Master’s .0259 .0262 -.197 -.201 -.0427 -.0436 
 
(.0116) (.0116) (.134) (.134) (.0280) (.0281) 
Highest Ph.D. .0577 .0573 -.114 -.122 .0051 .0034 
 
(.0127) (.0127) (.149) (.149) (.0317) (.0318) 
Contribution -.0009 -.0005 .233 .234 .0756 .0758 
 
(.002) (.002) (.0397) (.0396) (.0077) (.0077) 
Competence .007 .0066 .114 .113 .0484 .0482 
 
(.0017) (.0017) (.0360) (.0360) (.0064) (.0063) 
Ranked performance .0091 .0092 .356 .357 .0783 .0785 
 
(.001) (.001) (.0181) (.0181) (.0034) (.0034) 
Simple promotion -.113 -.161 -.137 -.294 -.129 -.167 
 (.0035) (.0057) (.0533) (.121) (.0116) (.0234) 
Promotion and transfer -.113 -.171 -.108 -.423 -.176 -.264 
 (.0073) (.0115) (.103) (.215) (.0214) (.0403) 
Simple transfer -.0376 -.0619 -.0488 .0493 -.0552 -.0384 
 (.0049) (.0071) (.075) (.143) (.0148) (.0267) 
Simple promotion x Time in job 
 
.0233  .0769  .0184 
  
(.0025)  (.0605)  (.0123) 
Promotion and transfer x Time in job 
 
.0305  .178  .0498 
  
(.0049)  (.111)  (.0192) 
Simple transfer x Time in job 
 
.0079  -.108  -.0211 
  
(.0035)  (.085)  (.0147) 
R-squared .863 .865 .69 .691 .845 .845 
Probability vs. prior model (Wald)  .0000  .0213  .0002 
P (simple prom. vs. simple trans.) .0000 .0000 .21 .0018 .0000 .0000 
P (prom./trans. vs. simple trans. .0000 .0000 .60 .022 .0000 .0000 
*Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual. Includes controls for city, year, 
rank, function, department, all interactions between rank and function, and all interactions 
between rank and division.  
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Table 5. Cox Analysis of Hazard Rates of Mobility.*  
 Promotion Involuntary Exit Voluntary Exit 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Full time -.794 -1.104 -.097 -.332 -1.344 -1.302 
 
(1.421) (1.482) (.290) (.288) (.235) (.230) 
Group turnover proportion -.133 .33 3.609 3.424 2.973 2.853 
 
(.356) (.362) (.133) (.136) (.156) (.156) 
Group turnover proportion at entry -1.615 -1.502 1.303 1.447 .580 .682 
 
(.318) (.345) (.199) (.199) (.214) (.213) 
Group hiring proportion .402 .389 -1.937 -1.904 -.459 -.463 
 
(.291) (.300) (.400) (.399) (.298) (.298) 
Group hiring proportion at entry -.274 -.154 -.922 -1.132 .286 .27 
 
(.242) (.252) (.262) (.269) (.232) (.233) 
Experience -.089 -.042 .0365 .0222 -.037 -.051 
 
(.007) (.007) (.0051) (.005) (.007) (.007) 
Male .233 .159 -.011 .008 .179 .179 
 
(.078) (.08) (.077) (.078) (.081) (.081) 
Asian .149 .309 .065 .062 .012 .042 
 
(.148) (.151) (.141) (.139) (.143) (.143) 
White .322 .283 -.251 -.247 -.13 -.076 
 
(.134) (.138) (.126) (.126) (.131) (.131) 
Highest Bachelor’s -.796 -.661 .055 .067 .202 .164 
 
(.224) (.233) (.202) (.204) (.302) (.302) 
Highest Master’s -.726 -.489 .222 .174 .064 -.026 
 
(.225) (.233) (.206) (.208) (.304) (.304) 
Highest Ph.D. -.669 -.414 .254 .188 -.038 -.139 
 
(.249) (.256) (.238) (.240) (.328) (.329) 
Log salary 3.729 2.296 -.574 -.017 1.263 1.644 
 
(.316) (.327) (.296) (.308) (.306) (.313) 
Simple promotion -.459 -.653 -.464 -.181 -.190 -.0631 
 (.077) (.08) (.088) (.091) (.087) (.088) 
Promotion and transfer -.297 -.330 -.846 -.533 -.462 -.326 
 (.175) (.179) (.205) (.206) (.174) (.174) 
Simple transfer 1.463 1.464 .284 .173 -.108 -.233 
 (.112) (.116) (.104) (.107) (.123) (.126) 
Ranked performance  .584  -.179  -.209 
 
 (.034)  (.033)  (.033) 
Contribution  -.041  -.481  -.01 
 
 (.065)  (.065)  (.063) 
Competence  .269  -.341  -.132 
 
 (.058)  (.058)  (.056) 
Observations 10,751 10,751 10,952 10,952 10,952 10,952 
Log likelihood -10226 -9857 -7610 -7435 -8001 -7953 
Chi-squared 1728 2466 1850 2200 1391 1488 
Degrees of freedom 638 641 148 151 148 151 
Probability vs. prior model (LR test) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
P(simple prom. vs. Prom. & trans.) .34 .06 .06 .08 .09 .11 
P(simple trans. vs. Prom./ & rans.) .000 .000 .000 .001 .48 .16 
nly contain years 2006-2009. Promotions and transfers are treated as censored events. All 
analyses also include controls for city, year, rank, function, all interactions between rank and 
function. Promotion analyses control for department; exit analyses control for division.  
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Table 6. Ordered Logit Analyses of Determinants of Performance by Hiring Source (N = 
3,792).  
 
Ranked Performance Competence Contribution 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Experience -.078 -.076 -.039 -.038 -.052 -.049 
 
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Male -.036 -.026 -.132 -.117 -.145 -.119 
 
(.097) (.097) (.101) (.1) (.101) (.101) 
Asian .124 .119 .259 .241 .449 .432 
 
(.149) (.151) (.174) (.172) (.176) (.176) 
White .458 .466 .490 .477 .496 .499 
 
(.137) (.139) (.156) (.154) (.156) (.156) 
Highest Bachelor’s -.285 -.283 -.306 -.315 -.953 -.979 
 
(.255) (.252) (.308) (.310) (.294) (.300) 
Highest Master’s -.382 -.387 -.395 -.417 -1.002 -1.041 
 
(.259) (.257) (.311) (.314) (.297) (.303) 
Highest Ph.D. -.558 -.555 -.251 -.266 -.959 -.994 
 
(.290) (.288) (.339) (.341) (.335) (.341) 
Time in job .401 .393 .279 .263 .454 .431 
 
(.041) (.041) (.042) (.041) (.043) (.0419) 
Former employee -.575   -.962   -.675 
 
 
(.663)   (.485)   (.552) 
 Internet application -.219   -.445   -.101 
 
 
(.221)   (.209)   (.201) 
 Temporary .274   -.02   .411 
 
 
(.306)   (.24)   (.338) 
 Unsolicited -.011   .095   .298 
 
 
(.113)   (.117)   (.116) 
 Intermediated -.340   -.204   -.274 
 
 
(.092)   (.097)   (.099) 
 Employee referral 
 
.200   .122 
 
.052 
  
(.081)   (.085) 
 
(.086) 
Cut 1 -.559 -.561 -8.441 -7.829 -6.405 -6.373 
 
(.865) (.905) (1.033) (1.051) (1.463) (1.562) 
Cut 2 -.162 -.165 -4.913 -4.302 -2.091 -2.061 
 
(.865) (.907) (.866) (.884) (1.055) (1.189) 
Cut3  2.565 2.551 -1.246 -.645 1.829 1.836 
 
(.868) (.908) (.863) (.883) (1.054) (1.187) 
Cut 4 2.941 2.927 1.534 2.126 5.236 5.219 
 
(.868) (.907) (.864) (.885) (1.060) (1.192) 
Cut 5 4.497 4.480     
  
 
(.871) (.910)     
  Log pseudo likelihood -5121 -5131 -3646 -3655 -3307 -3327 
Chi-squared 3616 3725 2831 2811 2539 2518 
Degrees of Freedom 105 101 103 100 103 100 
Probability .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
* Standard errors, clustered by individual, in parentheses. All analyses include dummies for rank, 
function, interactions between rank and function, division, year, and greater New York area. 
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Table 7: Ordinary Least Squares Regression of Determinants of Compensation by Hiring Source 
(N=3,792)* 
 
 Log Salary Log Bonus Log Total Compensation 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Experience .002 .003 .003 -.041 -.013 -.0132 -.009 -.0006 -.0009 
 
(.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.00166) (.001) (.0014) 
Male .013 .013 .012 -.16 -.17 -.17 .05 .062 .06 
 
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.1) (.09) (.094) (.02) (.016) (.016) 
Asian .002 -.00008 -.00007 -.04 -.11 -.10 .005 -.017 -.018 
 
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.18) (.17) (.17) (.03) (.026) (.026) 
White .006 .002 .002 .004 -.17 -.17 .01 -.02 -.022 
 
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.16) (.15) (.15) (.03) (.02) (.023) 
Time in job .001 -.0008 -.0003 -.006 -.11 -.10 .03 .003 .004 
 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.01) (.013) (.012) 
Group turnover 
proportion at entry .03 .027 .03 -.027 -.18 -.23 -.038 -.13 -.14 
 
(.03) (.028) (.03) (.62) (.54) (.54) (.14) (.13) (.13) 
Group hire proportion at 
entry -.03 -.029 -.03 -.14 -.05 .015 .047 .07 .074 
 
(.02) (.018) (.018) (.40) (.36) (.36) (.088) (.09) (.091) 
Group hire proportion   .015 .014 .012 .80 .78 .80 .049 .08 .081 
 
(.013) (.013) (.013) (.35) (.34) (.34) (.053) (.05) (.052) 
Group turnover 
proportion .036 .035 .035 .77 .68 .69 -.034 -.16 -.16 
 
(.018) (.018) (.018) (.53) (.52) (.52) (.077) (.085) (.085) 
Full time .79 .77 .77 1.35 .74 .75 .81 .80 .81 
 
(.24) (.23) (.23) (1.48) (1.35) (1.35) (.20) (.20) (.20) 
Terminated during year -.061 -.017 .037 -14.53 -12.85 -13.13 -2.39 -2.08 -2.17 
 
(.028) (.027) (.013) (.49) (.67) (.55) (.093) (.14) (.14) 
Days since hiring (max  -.00002 -.00006 -.00006 .003 .0015 .0015 .0008 .0004 .0004 
365) (.00004) (.00004) (.00004) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) 
Contribution 
 
.002 .0013 
 
.13 .12 
 
.056 .054 
  
(.003) (.003) 
 
(.089) (.09) 
 
(.016) (.016) 
Competence 
 
.01 .0098 
 
.15 .14 
 
.049 .050 
  
(.003) (.003) 
 
(.07) (.07) 
 
(.012) (.012) 
Ranked performance 
 
.009 .009 
 
.46 .46 
 
.087 .087 
  
(.0016) (.002) 
 
(.04) (.04) 
 
(.007) (.007) 
Highest Bachelor’s -.02 -.017 -.016 -.3 -.18 -.18 -.20 -.14 -.14 
 
(.016) (.015) (.015) (.4) (.36) (.36) (.05) (.037) (.038) 
Highest Master’s -.004 .0005 .001 -.40 -.22 -.22 -.18 -.11 -.11 
 
(.016) (.015) (.015) (.40) (.36) (.36) (.05) (.038) (.04) 
Highest Ph.D. .02 .028 .028 -.48 -.25 -.25 -.13 -.062 -.063 
 
(.017) (.017) (.017) (.43) (.38) (.38) (.05) (.046) (.046) 
Former employee .06 .064 
 
-.19 -.16 
 
-.12 -.037 
 
 
(.026) (.025) 
 
(.46) (.40) 
 
(.06) (.05) 
 Internet -.001 .0017 
 
.28 .37 
 
-.021 .04 
 
 
(.012) (.012) 
 
(.24) (.24) 
 
(.036) (.03) 
 Temporary -.0009 -.001 
 
.20 .15 
 
-.008 -.026 
 
 
(.017) (.016) 
 
(.21) (.18) 
 
(.037) (.043) 
 Unsolicited .001 .0005 
 
.053 .047 
 
.036 .03 
 
 
(.006) (.006) 
 
(.13) (.12) 
 
(.028) (.02) 
 Intermediated .009 .011 
 
.023 .14 
 
.05 .062 
 
 
(.005) (.005) 
 
(.11) (.098) 
 
(.02) (.021) 
 Employee referral 
  
-.0077 
  
-.11 
  
-.044 
   
(.0045) 
  
(.08) 
  
(.018) 
R-squared .89 .895 .894 .701 .73 .729 .796 .87 .87 
 
* Standard errors, clustered by individual, are in parentheses. Includes controls for city, year, all 
interactions between rank and function, all interactions between rank and department, and division. 
